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Summary. We examine how a society chooses to divide a given budget among
various regions, projects or individuals. In particular, we characterize the Banks
set and the Uncovered Set in such problems. We show that the two sets can be
proper subsets of the set of all alternatives, and at times are very pointed in their
predictions. This contrasts with well-known “chaos theorems,” which suggest that
majority voting does not lead to any meaningful predictions when the policy space
is multidimensional.
1 Introduction
McKelvey’s celebrated theorems [25], [26] on the genericity of global cycles in
majority voting are fundamental to our understanding of the potential out-
comes of a social decision process. These results assert that if the set of social
alternatives is a multidimensional Euclidean space, then under mild condi-
tions on the profile of voters’ preferences, there is a finite chain of alternatives
starting at any given x and ending in any other y such that each alternative in
the chain is preferred by a majority of voters to its predecessor. These results
are often interpreted to show that in multidimensional policy spaces majority
voting is chaotic or unstable since no alternative appears to dominate the
others.
? This paper was written in fond memory of our dear friend and colleague Jef-
frey Scot Banks. Financial support under NSF grant SES-0316493 is gratefully
acknowledged. We thank Salvador Barbera for helpful conversations that helped
spark some of the ideas behind the model we develop here, and David Austen-
Smith for detailed comments on an earlier draft.
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The general conclusions drawn from this interpretation of McKelvey’s
Chaos Theorems2 have led many people to believe that it is impossible to
predict the nature of social decision-making without a detailed specification
of social institutions and rules. For instance, Stiglitz [39] writes, “If, however,
there are a variety of dimensions-some individuals are liberal on some issues
and conservative on others-then the median voter is not well defined, and there
may be no equilibrium to the political process.” According to Perrson and
Tabellini [35], “By the mid-to late 1970s, theorists had clearly demonstrated
that searching for a universally applicable theory of political equilibrium is
a futile exercise. Further, majority voting would generically lead to cycles,
unless the voting agenda was restricted. . . . The outlook of many researchers
at the time was thus quite pessimistic: any positive theory of political choice
- whether it was based on majority voting or not - seemingly had to rely on
unattractive or arbitrary assumptions.”
These beliefs have resulted in a growing body of literature that derives so-
cial equilibria conditional on explicit specifications of the institutional struc-
ture. Without denying the importance of that direction of investigation, one
is left with the impression that except in exceptional cases, very little can be
said about social choice outcomes that is institution-free. This is problematic
if the equilibrium outcomes are highly sensitive to the fine details of the in-
stitutional process. For instance, if the “institution” resembles a bargaining
game, then the equilibrium outcome will typically depend on the specific bar-
gaining protocol. Therefore, it appears as if the unpredictability associated
with the chaos theorems has been replaced by a predictability that may suffer
from a lack of robustness.
The approach adopted in this paper, following another of McKelvey’s [27]
influential papers, is to explore whether there are some predictions about
majoritarian social choice outcomes that are “relatively” institution-free. More
precisely, is it possible to bound the set of “stable social outcomes” in the sense
that all social equilibria must lie within these bounds under a wide variety of
different institutional arrangements? In this paper, we focus on two such sets:
the Uncovered Set of Miller [29] and the Banks Set Banks [2].
The two sets are arguably the most appropriate ones to bound the possible
social outcomes. McKelvey [27] demonstrated3 that in any multidimensional
setting where voters have quasi-concave preferences (the so-called spatial set-
ting), the Uncovered Set contains the outcomes that would arise from equilib-
rium behavior under three different institutional frameworks : a two-candidate
competition in a large electorate4, cooperative behavior in small committees,
2 A version of the Chaos Theorem for the finite unstructured setting has been
proved by Bell [6]. We refer the reader to chapter 6 in Austen-Smith and Banks [1]
for an illuminating presentation of chaos results in the spatial model.
3 Miller [29] had already shown that under a variety of institutional settings, game
theoretic behavior by participants leads to outcomes in the Uncovered Set when
the set of alternatives is finite.
4 On this aspect, see also Banks, Duggan, and Le Breton [4].
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and sophisticated behavior in a legislative environment. Hence, in a strong
sense the Uncovered Set is a useful generalization of the notion of a Con-
dorcet winner. The Banks Set is less general than the Uncovered Set in that
it only applies to a specific institution. Nevertheless, that institution, voting
by amendment agendas (also known as voting by successive elimination), is
a very important one which is paradigmatic for most committee voting rules
and is the procedure central to Roberts Parliamentary Rules of Order. It is
often asserted that a chairman (or sub-committee) can manipulate the agenda
so as to ensure the choice of an alternative which is in his (or its) interest.
However, Miller and McKelvey showed that the set of sophisticated equilib-
rium outcomes corresponding to voting by successive elimination must lie in
the Uncovered Set; and Banks [2] provided a full characterization of this set
of outcomes, which is the Banks Set. Thus, the Banks Set puts some bounds
on the monopoly power of an agenda setter in the context of amendment
agendas.5
The uncovered and Banks Sets have been investigated extensively in the
case where the set of alternatives is finite and voters have no a priori structure
to their preferences, and so some properties of these sets are now well-known.6
However, the explicit computation of these sets is not easy, particularly when
the feasible set of alternatives is some subset of multi-dimensional Euclidean
space and one might expect some natural structure to voters’ preferences.
The only real analysis that has made any progress on that issue is in the case
of purely distributive politics, where Epstein [14] and Laslier and Picard [22]
have shown that the Uncovered Set is the entire set of alternatives;7 and recent
papers by Penn [33] and Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton [12] who show that
specific equilibrium notions of agenda formation can lead to some pointed
predictions in some circumstances.
This paper furthers our understanding of the structure of the behavior
of majority rule in spatial settings in two ways. The first is that we identify
a broad class of social choice problems that includes many situations that
have been analyzed separately in the literature. The common feature of these
problems is that an alternative is a feasible allocation of a given budget across
finitely many uses or projects. These projects could correspond to individu-
als if we model private transfers in a distributive politics environment, or to
districts or regions or different types of public expenditures in the context
of pork barrel politics and financing of local public goods (Ferejohn, Fiorina,
and McKelvey [17], Lockwood [24]). Other budget allocation problems cov-
ered by our framework include the mixed setting where some private projects
compete with a global public project as in Lizzeri and Persico [23]. Our key
5 Miller, Grofman, and Feld [30] and Miller, Grofman, and Feld [31] argue that the
interest for studying the Banks Set goes beyond this.
6 See Laslier [21] for a detailed description of this area of research.
7 See also McKelvey [27], Banks, Duggan, and Le Breton [5], Cox [9], De Don-
der [10], Feld et al. [16], Fey [18], Hartley and Kilgour [19], Koehler [20].
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assumption is that voters’ preferences are linear; that is, indifference contour
sets are parallel hyperplanes. While a special case of the spatial model, this is
a rich setting that to the best of our knowledge has never been investigated
in any generality before. Our second contribution is to provide some (partial)
characterizations of the uncovered, Banks, and Top Cycle sets in this setting,
in the context of some important special cases. In particular, we examine in
some detail the case where each voter views each project as either being good
or bad.
In the next section, we introduce and illustrate the linear setting and the
main concepts which are used in this paper. In sect. 3, we introduce the main
majoritarian sets which are examined in this paper. Then, in sects. 4-7, we
focus on the special case where there are three projects and three voters. In
sect. 4, we present the simple geometry of the majority relation in the linear
setting. We show that the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence
of a Condorcet winner in this setting is less stringent than the well-known
condition of Plott [36]. We also offer a direct simple proof of McKelvey’s
chaos theorem on the Top Cycle. Then, we calculate explicitly the Uncovered
Set for many important linear settings. We also calculate or describe with
some accuracy the Banks Set to show how much it differs from the Uncovered
Set. We conclude in sect. 8 with a discussion of the general case.
2 A Model of Budget Allocation where Voters have
Linear Preferences
Alternatives
The set of alternatives X consists of the set of feasible allocations of a
given budget, denoted by M , among K distinct possible uses. The uses may
be thought of, depending upon the context, as being districts, regions, indi-
viduals, public projects or other criteria. Generic elements of X are denoted
x, y, and z, and are K-dimensional vectors.
If money is assumed to be perfectly divisible, then the set X is infinite. In
this case, X is the simplex{
x ∈ IRK+ :
K∑
k=1
xk = M
}
.
When M = 1, the set of social alternatives could be alternatively interpreted
as the set of lotteries over an unstructured finite set of choices.
If, instead, money can only be divided into discrete units, with say 1 being
the smallest unit of money, then the set X is finite. It is then defined as8
8 We presume that the entire budget is allocated. This is in line with voters viewing
at least one of the projects as not being objectionable.
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x ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,M}K :
K∑
k=1
xk = M
}
.
We shall alternate between the use of these two settings. While the in-
finitely divisible setting provides some technical advantages, we stick with the
finite world in situations where we analyze the Banks Set, as an uncontro-
versial definition for the Banks Set has not been given for the case where X
is infinite. We shall discuss the limit as the units become small (M becomes
large), and this provides some predictions for the infinite case.
This also gives us some feel for the importance of divisibilities, as we shall
see that at least in some cases the Banks Set changes as the units become
relatively small, and the limit may have different features from situations
with substantial indivisibilities.
We assume that M ≥ 4 in the indivisible setting, as the case where M ≤ 3
is an easily analyzed special case where the geometry of the problem degen-
erates.
Voters and Preferences
The committee or society of voters is described by the finite set N =
{1, . . . , N}.
Voter i has preferences over the set of alternatives represented as follows.
There exists a vector ui ∈ IRK such that the utility to i of an alternative x is
simply ui ·x. Thus, i prefers an alternative x to an alternative y if and only if
ui · x > ui · y.
Thus, uki denotes i’s marginal valuation for project k. So, preferences are
completely described by the matrix u ≡ (u1, ...., uN ) ∈ IRNK .
The linearity of indifference is obviously special; but, as we now illustrate,
it is general enough to cover a large family of interesting problems.
Example 1. Private Projects: Divide the Dollar
This corresponds to the case where K = N and the matrix u is equivalent
to
u =
1 0 · · 0
0 1 · · ·
· · · · ·
· · · · ·
0 · · · 1
The conventional interpretation of this problem is that an alternative is a
division of the amount M among the N voters, who are assumed to derive util-
ity exclusively from the amount they receive, the larger the better. A second
6 Dutta, Jackson, Le Breton
interpretation views the K dimensions as K public projects in competition
and assuming that each voter cares exclusively about the amount allocated
to a specific project, justifying the terminology “private projects” even if the
projects have the features of public projects.
Example 2. Goods and Bads
Consider a world where each dimension is viewed by a voter as either a
“good” or a “bad” project. Goods are equivalent in the voter’s view, as are
bads. To normalize things, goods have a marginal value of 1 and bads have a
marginal value of 0. So each ui is a vector of 0’s and 1’s.
A special case of this is the divide the dollar setting described in Exam-
ple 1, where each player has a different dimension that is a good, and only
one dimension, and where the number of dimensions is the number of voters
K = N . Another special case is the private and public good example (Exam-
ple 3, below), in the case where b = 1. More generally, the goods and bads
model is one where K might differ from N , several voters might view any
particular dimension as good, and players might consider several dimensions
to be “goods.”
Example 3. Private Projects versus a Public Project
This example, inspired by Lizzeri and Persico [23], is a setting mixing the
divide the dollar setting (Example 1) with an extra public project that is a
pure public good. Here voters are bargaining between allocating resources to
a common public good, and payments directly to the voters themselves. In
particular, K = N + 1 and
u =
1 0 · · 0 b
0 1 · · 0 b
· · · · · ·
· · · · · ·
0 0 · · 1 b
where b is a positive parameter describing the common willingness to pay of
each voter for the public project.
Example 4. Choice Between Public Projects
Consider a society allocating resources to any of a list of projects, which
may have private and/or public components. In this case, there are no specific
restrictions on the matrix u. The K dimensions are interpreted as K different
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potentially projects that are in competition for funding. The allocation xk
defines the scale of operation of project k (variations in costs can be incor-
porated into the marginal utilities). Certainly, voter i would like to see all
the budget allocated to his or her “favorite projects” (projects k such that
uki ≥ uk
′
i for all k
′). However, unlike the goods and the bads model, an agent
is not systematically indifferent between projects that are identical in their
allocation to the agent’s most preferred projects.
When K = N , and the K dimensions are interpreted as districts or states
in a federation or regions in a country, this model describes pork barrel politics
with some form of externalities across projects. Suppose that region i derives a
benefit equal to xi from project i operated at the scale xi, but also derives some
benefits from projects implemented in other regions. The benefits resulting
from these other projects are less important, the more “distant” is the region
(where distance might or might not be a physical measure). Precisely, uki =
1 − αdik. Knowledge of the intensity α of the externality and the pattern
describing the geographical network, is essential for understanding the voting
behavior.9
Example 5. Criteria
When bargaining over the split of a budget, it is often the case that the
discussion takes place on various criteria that might be used to allocate the
budget instead of directly in terms of the allocation itself.10 For instance,
consider a university deciding on how to allocate a budget among a set of
departments. The decision might be based on a whole set of criteria including
quality of research and teaching measured by various indicators, numbers of
students, numbers of researchers, etc. Let K be the number of such criteria.
With respect to these criteria, voter i (say department i) is described by the
vector λi = (λ1i , ...., λ
K
i ) as to how “much” of each criterion voter i possesses.
So, λ1i might be a measure of department i’s research output, λ
2
i might be a
measure of the number of students enrolled in the department i’s courses, and
so on.
Here, an alternative x is a decision on the relative weight of each criterion
in allocating the budget. Given an x the allocation of the budget is such that
voter (department) i receives
M
K∑
k=1
xk
λki∑
1≤j≤N λ
k
j
.
For instance, if x2 = 1/3, then in the university example 1/3 of the budget will
be allocated based on the number of students that a department has. There,
λ2i∑
1≤j≤N λ
2
j
would measure the fraction of all students that a given department
has.
9 See Lockwood [24] for an analysis of a model with externalities.
10 We thank Salvador Barbera for having suggested this problem.
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Presuming that voter i prefers to be allocated as much of the budget as
possible, we end up with preferences for voter i described by
uki =
λki∑
1≤j≤N λ
k
j
,
for each k.
3 Majority Voting and Tournaments
Let us now discuss how we model the choice of alternatives made by voters.
The strict majority preference induced by a profile u of preferences is
denoted by T (u) and defined over X as follows.
xT (u)y ⇔ # {i ∈ N : ui · x > ui · y} > # {i ∈ N : ui · y > ui · x}
If N is odd and individual preferences are strict, then T = T (u) is complete.11
Otherwise, ties may occur and this results in some freedom in how one defines
the sets and procedures that we examine next.
For the following definitions, T may be an arbitrary asymmetric (and
possibly incomplete) binary relation.
Condorcet Winners
An alternative x is a Condorcet winner if :
xTy for all y ∈ X\ {x} .
An alternative x is a weak Condorcet winner if :
not [yTx] for any y ∈ X.
Let WC(T ) denote the set of weak Condorcet winners associated with T .
In the case where T is complete, the two definitions coincide. In fact, it is
easy to see that whenever there is a Condorcet winner then that alternative
must also be the unique weak Condorcet winner. However, in cases where T
is incomplete it is possible for there to exist many weak Condorcet winners,
in which case there is no Condorcet winner.
The Top Cycle
As the majority preference is not necessarily transitive, it can have cycles.
A prominent cycle that we refer to in the sequel is the Top Cycle associated
with T .
11 A binary relation which is asymmetric and complete is called a tournament.
See Laslier [21] for an illuminating account of the principal results in the vast
literature on tournaments and majority voting.
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Let a weak T -chain between alternatives x and y be a sequence of al-
ternatives x1, . . . , xk such that x1 = x, xk = y, and not xj+1Txj for each
j = 1, . . . , k − 1.
The Top Cycle of T , denoted by TC(T ) is the set12
TC(T ) = {x | ∀y ∈ X,∃ a weak T-chain betweenx and y}
Thus, the Top Cycle is the set of alternatives that can reach any alternative
in X via some weak T -chain.
The Uncovered Set
The Uncovered Set of T , denoted UC(T ), is the set of maximal elements
of the covering relation C(T ) defined over X. Defining C(T ) by
xC(T )y if and only if xTy and for all z ∈ X : yTz implies xTz,
UC(T ) = {x | not yC(T )x∀y ∈ X}.
Again, it should be pointed out that when T is not complete, there are
several possible of the Uncovered Set. The definition above, which is the most
relevant for our subsequent analysis of the Banks Set, corresponds to UCd in
Bordes, Le Breton and Salles [3], to Fd in Bordes, Le Breton, and Salles [7]
and to Miller’s subset in [8]. It does not correspond to the definition of the
Uncovered Set which is found in Banks, Duggan, and Le Breton [4], Banks,
Duggan, and Le Breton [5], Dutta and Laslier [13] and McKelvey [27]. There,
the Uncovered Set is defined as the set of maximal elements of the partial
order C(T ) defined over X by
xC(T )y iff xTy and for all z ∈ X : [yTz implies xTz] and [zTx implies zTy]
Let
UC(T ) = {x | not yC(T )x∀y ∈ X}.
Since C(T ) is a subrelation of C(T ), the Uncovered Set that we focus on in
this paper UC(T ) is a subset of this other Uncovered Set UC(T ).
Amendment Agendas and Voting by Successive Elimination
A prominent procedure that selects a single allocation out of the feasible set
X is that based on amendment agendas, as central to Roberts Parliamentary
Rules of Order. This procedure, is also often referred to as voting by successive
elimination in the literature, and is defined as follows.
Consider an ordering σ of the finite set of alternatives X and let σ =
(x1, . . . , xL) where L denotes the number of alternatives in X. A vote is first
12 When the majority preference is not complete, there are various possible defini-
tions of the Top Cycle (see Schwartz [37] and Duggan and Le Breton [11]). All of
these definitions coincide with the definition of TC considered in this paper when
the majority preference is complete.
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taken to eliminate either xM or xM−1. The ‘winning’ alternative from the first
round is compared to xM−2, and a vote is taken to eliminate either surviving
alternative from the first vote or xM−2, and so on. After (M−1) comparisons,
the last surviving alternative is declared to be the voting outcome.
At each stage, the elimination of one alternative is according to majority
voting, or more generally according to the binary relation T . This is well-
specified when T is complete. In cases where there are ties under the majority
preference relation, or T is incomplete, the voting procedure needs to be more
completely specified. We do so as follows. At each stage allow individuals to
vote for one of the two alternatives or to abstain (in the case where they are
indifferent). In case of a tie in the voting between alternatives xl and xl′ , xl
is elected if and only if xl comes before xl′ in the ordering σ of voting; that
is, l < l′. This favors alternatives proposed earlier in the agenda under ties,
which is a natural way to break ties given that they have not already been
broken under T .
In order to determine the eventual voting outcome, it is also necessary to
describe how voters act. We consider the case where they vote strategically
at each stage, and so focus on the sophisticated voting outcome of this bi-
nary voting procedure.13 This is the outcome under the iterative elimination
of weakly dominated strategies that has been well-studied. As demonstrated
by Shepsle and Weingast [38],14 the sophisticated outcome induced by the
ordering σ, denoted S(σ, T ), is equal to wσL which is the last element of the
finite sequence described by the following algorithm:
wσ1 = x1, and for all l > 1 w
σ
l =
{
xl if xlTwσl′ for all l
′ < l, and
wσl−1, otherwise.
The Banks Set
The Banks Set Banks [2], denoted B(T ), is the subset of alternatives which
are sophisticated outcomes for at least one ordering of X. Formally,
B(T ) = {x ∈W : ∃σ ∈ Σ such that x = S(σ, u)} ,
where Σ denotes the set of permutations of X.
Let a T -chain between alternatives x and y be a sequence of alternatives
x1, . . . , xk such that x1 = x, xk = y, and xjTxj+1 for each j = 1, . . . , k − 1.
Given an alternative x ∈ X, an x-chain of T is a chain H with x ∈ H such
that xTy for all y ∈ H. The set of all x-chains is denoted H(x, T ).
13 For more on sophisticated voting, see Farquharson [15] and McKelvey and
Niemi [28].
14 The Shepsle-Weingast algorithm was defined for the case where T is complete.
Our procedure of breaking possible ties in the majority preference relation coming
earlier in the ordering σ ensures that the sophisticated outcome can be derived
from a straightforward variation on the algorithm derived by Shepsle and Wein-
gast, as shown, for instance, in Banks and Bordes [3].
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Thus, an x-chain is a chain where x beats all the other alternatives in the
chain according to T .
The characterization provided by Banks [2], stated to accommodate the
possible incompleteness, can be stated as follows.
Proposition 1. (Reference Banks [2])
B(T ) = {x | ∃H ∈ H(x, T ) s.t. ∀y /∈ H ∃z ∈ H s.t. not yTz}.
Thus, Banks showed that the outcomes found by varying the ordering
(for a fixed tournament) of the amendment agenda when voting by successive
elimination correspond to the endpoints of chains, where the chains are such
that any alternative not included in the chain is beaten by something in the
chain. The intuition behind the characterization is that the alternatives in the
chain are those who temporarily “win” at some stage in the voting (the wk’s
in the Shepsle-Weingast algorithm), and the remaining alternatives are those
who are eliminated at their stages.
The following variation on well-known inclusions is helpful in what follows.
Lemma 1. If T is an asymmetric binary relation, then WC(T ) ⊂ B(T ) ⊂
UC(T ) ⊂ TC(T ).
The first inclusion is easily seen by noting that any weak Condorcet winner
forms a maximal T -chain. This means that if the ordering is such that this
weak Condorcet winner appears first in the order, then it will be the outcome
of the amendment agenda, as no other alternative beats it. The second in-
clusion appears as theorem 4.1 in Banks and Bordes [3]. The third inclusion
follows easily from the definitions.
In what follows we use the notation WC(u), B(u), UC(u), TC(u) to denote
the sets WC(T (u)), B(T (u)), UC(T (u)), TC(T (u)).
In the following sections, we examine the simplest framework for which
the class of allocation problems described in the preceding section is not de-
generate. If K = 2 or N = 2, there is always at least one weak Condorcet
winner and all sets coincide with the set of weak Condorcet winners. When
K ≥ 3 and N ≥ 3, the set of (weak) Condorcet winners is sometimes empty
or some set of points that is not a singleton and not the whole set, and the
determination of TC, UC, and B becomes more challenging and interesting
as we have a true multidimensional problem. Thus, in what follows we restrict
attention to the case of K = N = 3.
4 The Simple Geometry of the Majority Relation and
the Top Cycle
In this section, we consider the continuous version of X and assume, without
loss of generality, that M = 1. Under the assumption that K = N = 3, we are
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in position to use the simple geometry of the triangle to support our formal
arguments. Given these dimensionality assumptions,
X =
{
x = (x1, x2) ∈ IR2+ : x1 + x2 ≤ 1
}
;
that is, X is the triangle represented on Fig. 1. The three vertices of the
triangle are denoted e1, e2 and e3.
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Representation of the alternatives
Given u ∈ uN and x ∈ X, let U(u, x) be the set of alternatives that are
considered strictly superior to x by a majority, the so-called win set of x and
by L(u, x) the set of alternatives that are considered strictly inferior to x by
a majority of voters. When there is no Condorcet winner, these two sets are
the union of three simple sets as pictured in Fig. 2.
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Figure 2
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The following simple consequences of the linearity assumption on prefer-
ences will be very useful in the sequel.
(a) If xT (u)y, z ∈ X and λ > 0, then λx+ (1− λ)z T (u) λy + (1− λ)z.
(b) If xT (u)y and λ, µ ∈ [0, 1], then λ > µ implies λx + (1 − λ)y T (u) µx +
(1− µ)y.
(c) An immediate consequence of (a) is that if U(x, u) 6= ∅, then U(u, x)
intersects the boundary of X; a similar observation applies to L(u, x).
(d)We deduce from (b) that if x majority dominates y, then any point be-
longing to the line segment joining x and y majority dominates any other
point of the segment which is farther away from x.
In the rest of this section, we rule out preference profiles which either offer
little interest or will be examined in some subsequent sections. In particular,
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we assume that each voter has a unique ideal point. It is straightforward to
see that the linearity assumption implies that this ideal point is necessarily
a vertex of the triangle; i.e., the ideal point must be one of e1, e2 or e3. We
also assume that the three ideal points are all different, as otherwise at least
two voters have the same ideal point, which is then the unique Condorcet
winner. Without loss of generality, let ei be the ideal point of voter i for all
i = 1, 2, 3. Finally, we limit our attention to the generic case where a given
voter is never indifferent between the ideal points of the two other voters. A
profile of preferences u displaying these features is described by matrix with
three degrees of freedom. A profile of preferences is completely described by a
vector u ≡ (v1, v2, v3) ∈ (0, 1)3 where vi denotes the intensity of the preference
of voter i for his second best choice among the vertices. Within this class of
linear preference profiles, two situations may appear:
(1) None of the vertices dominates the two other vertices. Up to a permutation
of voters’ labels, a profile of preferences u in this category is described by
a matrix
u =
1 0 v3
v1 1 0
0 v2 1
where 0 < v1, v2, v3 < 1.
(2) One of the vertices majority dominates the two other vertices. When this
happens, we call such a vertex a vertex Condorcet winner as it would be
the obvious winner if competition was limited to the finite set of vertices.
Up to a permutation of voters’ labels, a profile of preferences u in this
category is described by a matrix
u =
1 v2 v3
v1 1 0
0 0 1
where 0 < v1, v2, v3 < 1.
We first examine the conditions under which a Condorcet winner exists.
Proposition 2. Let u ≡ (v1, v2, v3) ∈ (0, 1)3 be a profile of preferences as
described in (1) and (2) above. x is a Condorcet winner for u, if and only if
it is a vertex and u falls in category (2) and satisfies v2 + v3 ≥ 1 (where up
to a permutation of labels, vertex e1 is the winner).
Proposition 2 departs in a fundamental way from Plott’s well-known nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner in the
spatial model. His result asserts that for some alternative x to be a Condorcet
winner, it has to be that x is the ideal point of some voter i and for any other
voter j, there exists a voter k such that the normalized gradients of the utility
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functions of j and k evaluated in x are exactly opposite. Since such symme-
try conditions are not robust to perturbations of preferences, a corollary of
Plott’s result is that Condorcet winners do not exist generically. It is often
forgotten that this applies only if x is in the interior or relative interior of
the feasible set, which is vacuously true if X is the entire Euclidean space.
If, instead, like here, X is a compact convex subset of the Euclidean space,
then Plott’s conditions do not apply to alternatives on the boundary.15 This
applies systematically in our linear setting, since we just demonstrated that
Condorcet winners, when they exist, are on the boundary. The necessary and
sufficient condition stated in Proposition 2 is robust to perturbations.
Let us make a final comment on the existence of Condorcet winners. The
linear setting is a natural generalization of the finite setting and will be at least
as complicated as the finite setting in that the majority tournament limited
to the set of vertices can take any form. But the linear setting is richer in
that a vertex doing well when matched exclusively against the other vertices
may be defeated by a majority when compromises are introduced. Suppose u
displays the pattern
u =
1 v2 v3
v1 1 0
0 0 1
.
Then e1 is a vertex Condorcet winner: voters 2 and 3 cannot agree on another
vertex. Can they agree on something else? They can if the intensity of their
preference for e1 is not too large, as stated by the inequality v2 + v3 < 1 in
Proposition 2. The condition is fairly intuitive since if v2 and v3 are small
enough then the gap between their second best and worst choices vanishes,
and it becomes possible to find a compromise λe2 + (1 − λ)e3 preferred by
both of them to e1. Figs. 3 and 4 illustrate the two conceivable situations.
15 Plott [36] applies a budget constraint, but does not impose any nonnegativity
constraints and so does not consider boundary issues in the manner considered
here.
16 Dutta, Jackson, Le Breton
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The following proposition provides a complete description of TC(u) when
u ≡ (v1, v2, v3) ∈ (0, 1)3 is a profile of preferences as described above.
Proposition 3. Let u be a profile of preferences as described in (1) or (2)
above. Then, either there is a Condorcet winner, or TC(u) = X, or TC(u) =
X\{ei} for some i.
Proposition 3 is a version of McKelvey’s chaos theorem in our linear set-
ting. The proof offered in the appendix shows how a cycle connecting any
two alternatives is constructed, and the problems raised by the existence of a
boundary are addressed. In contrast to the conditions leading to the existence
of a Condorcet winner, the boundary does not have much impact here, as the
only departure from total chaos is the exclusion of a Condorcet loser, when
there is one.
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5 The Goods and Bads Model
In this section, we return to the discrete version of the problem, still keeping
with N = K = 3. We focus on the goods and bads model of example 2 and
characterize all of the sets, including the Banks and Uncovered Sets.
Let us first start with the analysis of a prominent case that falls in the
goods and bads model: that of the divide the dollar model.
Proposition 4. Consider the divide the dollar model of Example 1. The set
of weak Condorcet winners is empty, the Top Cycle is the whole set of alter-
natives, and the Uncovered Set is the set of alternatives excluding the ver-
tices. The Banks Set includes every x ∈ X such that xi < [(xj + xk)2 +
5(xj + xk) − 4]/2, for some i and distinct j, k. Thus, the size of the Banks
Set converges to the size of the set of alternatives as the grid becomes finer
(limM→∞
#B(u)
#X = 1). However, the Banks Set is a strict subset of the Un-
covered Set for any M > 5; as (M − 1, 1, 0) and permutations of these points
are not in the Banks Set.16
Proposition 4 provides a different view of the Banks Set than what is
previously known. While in some finite settings with arbitrary preferences,
one can find examples where the Banks Set is a strict subset of the Uncovered
Set (see Banks [2]), it was not known whether this was true in more naturally
structured environments. Indeed, Penn [34] shows that in an infinitely divisible
version of a divide the dollar game with three players, the Banks Set and
Uncovered Set coincide.17 Here, in contrast, the Banks Set makes a selection
from the Uncovered Set. As the indivisibilities disappear, the sets converge
to each other, with the Banks Set always remaining a strict subset of the
Uncovered Set.
Let us now return to the more general analysis of the goods and bads
model, where players may agree on which dimensions are goods, and may like
several dimensions.
Let sk =
∑
i u
k
i and s =
∑
k s
k =
∑
i
∑
k u
k
i . Note that s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 9},
and sk ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
Thus, sk is the strength of the support for dimension k. The analysis of
the various sets now depends on the relative strengths of the dimensions.
16 For larger M , one can also check that (M−2, 2, 0) and (M−2, 1, 1) (and permuta-
tions) are not in the Banks Set, and so forth; but the proofs become increasingly
tedious as the number of chains to be ruled out grow as we move away from the
vertices.
17 Penn’s definition of the Banks Set in infinite settings is directly in terms of maxi-
mal chains rather than in terms of an agenda, and her tie-breaking rule is different
from ours. It is not clear that there is an unambiguously appealing definition of
the Banks Set in the infinite setting, as without some modifications of tie-breaking
there does not exist any maximal chains.
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Proposition 5. Consider the goods and bads model from Example 2, and as-
sume that at least one voter is not completely indifferent. Without loss of
generality, label the dimensions so that s1 ≥ s2 ≥ s3.
(1) If one dimension dominates the others (s1 > s2), then the vertex corre-
sponding to that dimension is a Condorcet winner and all the sets coincide
(TC(u) = UC(u) = B(u) = WC(u) = {(M, 0, 0)}).
(2) If there are two dimensions that have the same strength and dominate the
third (s1 = s2 > s3), then there is no Condorcet winner and the sets
include all points that allocate only to the first two dimensions (TC(u) =
UC(u) = B(u) = WC(u) = {x | x3 = 0}).
(3) In the case where the strength of support for the three dimensions is iden-
tical (s1 = s2 = s3):
(3a) If some voter is completely indifferent, then no alternative beats any
other, and so X = WC(u) = B(u) = UC(u) = TC(u).
(3b) If each voter views a different two dimensions as goods, then WC(u) =
{(M, 0, 0), (0,M, 0), (0, 0,M)}, while TC(u) = X, and B(u) = UC(u) =
X \ {(M − 2, 1, 1), (1,M − 2, 1), (1, 1,M − 2)}.
(3c) If each voter views one dimension as a good then we are back in the
divide the dollar game setting as characterized in Proposition 4.
Proposition 5 states that the analysis of the goods and bads model breaks
into five cases, basically depending on how much agreement there is among
the voters as to which dimensions are goods. When there is enough agree-
ment (as in (1) or (2)), then the predictions are narrow, while when there is
significant disagreement (as in (3a) (3b) and (3c)) then many voting cycles
appear and the sets are nearer to the entire space. Interestingly, the only sit-
uation where something falls in between is in the divide the dollar game with
smaller M (substantial indivisibilities) where the Banks Set is narrower than
the Uncovered Set and Top Cycle.
More specifically, in the first case, there is some dimension that receives
more support than any other, and then giving the full budget to this dimension
is a Condorcet winner. In the second case, there are two dimensions that
are viewed as goods by an equal number of voters and the third dimension
is viewed as a good by a lesser number. Here, the set of weak Condorcet
winners is the set of alternatives that give only to the two dimensions with
broader support. In the third, fourth, and fifth cases, all of the dimensions
have equal support. However, they behave quite differently. In the third case,
no alternative beats any other, as the two voters who are not indifferent
completely disagree on the goods and bads, and so all sets are the whole
space. In the fourth case, the three vertices form the set of Weak Condorcet
winners. The Top Cycle is the whole set X, while the Banks and Uncovered
Sets are almost the entire set X. The fifth case refers to the divide the dollar
game, as already discussed.
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6 Beyond the Goods and Bads Model
We have offered a complete description of WC(u), TC(u) and UC(u), and
some bounds on the description of B(u), for the goods and bads model. In this
section, we return to the more general linear model. In Sect. 4, we analyzed
that model in terms of understanding the Top Cycle. We now return to that
analysis to see what we can say about the Uncovered Set.
Precisely, we focus on the generic case where there is not a Condorcet
winner and the profile of preferences is described by the pattern
u =
1 v2 v3
v1 1 0
0 0 1
,
where 0 < v1, v2, v3 < 1. Thus, e1 is a vertex Condorcet winner, as it beats
the other vertices in a majority contest.
What does the Uncovered Set look like in such a setting? If e1 is a Con-
dorcet winner, then obviously UC(u) =
{
e1
}
. So let us assume that e1 is
not a Condorcet winner. From Proposition 2, this holds true if and only if
v2 + v3 < 1. In such a case, TC(u) rules out the Condorcet loser e3, but
none of the points arbitrarily close to e3. The following proposition demon-
strates that there is a neighborhood of e3 which is outside UC(u). The proof
technique is based on the following simple but useful lemma which follows
immediately from the definition of covering (C(T )).
Lemma 2. x ∈ UC(u) if and only if for all y ∈ Y either not yTx or there
exists z ∈ X such that xTz and not yTz.
This lemma states a version of the two-step principle (a terminology due
to Miller and McKelvey). Indeed, the lemma states that to be in the Uncov-
ered Set an alternative x must weakly majority dominate any other alter-
native in either one step or two steps; and if there are two steps then the
first component of the weak T -chain must be strict. Let L2(x) be the set
(X\U(u, x)) ∪ (∪y∈L(u,x)(X\U(u, y))).18 The lemma asserts that x ∈ UC(u)
if and only if L2(x) = X.
Proposition 6. Let u be as discussed above and x = (x1, x2) ∈ X. Then,
x ∈ UC(u) if and only if
x1
v1
+
x2
v2
≥ 1
It is interesting to note that the condition in Proposition 6 does not involve
v3. If v1 = v2 ≡ v, then the condition in the Proposition is simply that:
x1 + x2 ≥ v.
18 The notation L2 is justified by the fact that when T is a tournament, L2(x) =
L(u, x) ∪ (∪y∈L(u,x)L(u, y)).
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Obviously, from Proposition 6 it follows that the Uncovered Set rules out
many points around e3. This is a first step in an exploration of UC(u). This
provides the interesting conclusion that the Uncovered Set is a subset of the
space of alternatives that depends in interesting ways on the utility profile.
Likely, a similar analysis can be conducted in the case where there is no
vertex Condorcet winner.
7 The Mixed Private versus Public Goods Model
In this final section, we investigate the mixed private versus public goods
model defined as Example 3. In this model, a profile of preferences is identified
by the single positive parameter b describing the common willingness to pay
of each voter for the public project. To emphasize this specificity, we use the
notation WC(b), TC(b) and UC(b) instead of WC(u), TC(u) and UC(u).
The following proposition describes the dependence of the three sets19 upon
the parameter b.
Proposition 7. Consider the mixed private versus public goods model from
Example 3.
(1) If the benefit from the public good is large (b > 12), then allocating the
entire budget to the public good is a Condorcet Winner (and thus, WC(b) =
UC(b) = TC(b) = (0, 0, 0,M) ).
(2) If the benefit from the public good is intermediate (13 < b <
1
2), then
there are no weak Condorcet winners, the Top Cycle is the whole set of al-
ternatives, and the Uncovered Set is the set of alternatives such that at most
two voters get a positive amount of the private good and no voter gets the
entire supply of the private good (UC(b) = {x ∈ X : xi = 0 for at least one
i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and xk 6= M for any k ∈ {1, 2, 3}}).
(3) If the benefit from the public good is small (b < 13), then the sets
look like they do in the divide the dollar game (WC(b) = ∅, UC(b) ={
x ∈ X : x4 = 0 and xk 6= M for any k
}
and TC(b) = X).
Proposition 7 demonstrates that the presence of the public project has
an impact on the distributive politics component of the budget allocation.
If the benefit from the public good is sufficient, then it swamps the private
allocation, as in (1). If it is too small, then the problem becomes similar to the
divide the dollar game, as in (3). In the middle case, we see some interesting
impact of the public good. One voter among the three should derive his payoff
exclusively from public consumption. This is due to the fact that when b > 13 ,
the Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson first order optimality condition rules out any
interior allocation. Since the Uncovered Set is a subset of the Pareto set, this
provides an upper bound. We prove that, in fact, the two sets coincide.
19 We have not calculated the Banks Set in this model.
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8 Concluding Remarks and Higher Dimensions
We have shown that it is possible to make predictions about the nature of
voting equilibria under majoritarian rule that are not too sensitive to specific
institutional details, even in multi-dimensional policy space. We did this by
analyzing budget allocation problems where voters’ preferences are linear.
Section 4 describes the geometric structure of the Top Cycle set. Proposi-
tion 2 showed that if there is a Condorcet winner, then it must be a vertex.
We also found that the conditions under which a Condorcet winner exists
extend Plott’s analysis because they are applicable even when a Condorcet
winner lies on the boundary of the feasible set - which is absent from his anal-
ysis. Having a boundary on the problem provides a different perspective than
one gets from Plott’s analysis, and the possibility of a Condorcet winner is
no longer so extreme. Proposition 3 is the counterpart of Mckelvey’s chaos
theorems, and shows that if a Condorcet winner does not exist, then the Top
Cycle set is virtually the entire set - at most it excludes the three vertices.
So, while we still come to the conclusion that the Top Cycle is either a single
point or the whole space, the conditions under which it is a single point are
no longer so extreme.
We went on to consider the goods and bads model, where voters view each
dimension as either a good or a bad. Proposition 5 demonstrates that there
are cases where the Banks Set and Uncovered Sets are strict subsets of the
feasible set, even in situations where no Condorcet winner exists. The Banks
Set is generally a strict subset of the Uncovered Set, but the difference between
the two sets disappears as the divisibility of the budget becomes finer.
In sect. 6, we returned to the more general linear preference framework of
sect. 4, but restrict attention to the analysis of preference profiles which give
rise to a vertex Condorcet winner. We characterize the Uncovered Set and
show that it excludes a neighborhood of points close to the vertex Condorcet
loser. This provides an interesting setting in which the Uncovered Set makes
pointed predictions about the outcome of any majority rule based collective
decision.
Finally, sect. 7 looks at the “mixed” public and private goods model (Ex-
ample 3). Not surprisingly, voters’ common willingness to pay for the public
good turns out to be the crucial parameter in this model. If this willingness
to pay is very high, then the entire budget will be spent in production of the
public good under majoritarian rule. Conversely, if the willingness to pay is
low, then the Uncovered Set excludes production of the public good. The in-
teresting case is when the common willingness to pay takes on an intermediate
value, and then the Uncovered Set predicts that at least one voter must be
excluded from consumption of the private good.
The bulk of our analysis was in the special case where there are three
projects and three voters, as that case is still tractable and yet introduces the
full force of multi-dimensionality. Certainly, it is worthwhile to explore beyond
this. While the extension to more than three projects and/or three voters does
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not raise conceptual difficulties, it is obviously much trickier. One reason is
that the linear model is at least as difficult as the finite model and therefore
moving to larger K complicates the combinatorics of the problem, as we know
from the theory of majority tournaments. We have listed below several direc-
tions of investigation that seem promising to explore as a continuation of the
analysis performed here.
• What happens to the goods and bads model in higher dimensions? The
following conjecture might be considered.
Conjecture: Consider the goods and bads model, and a case where there
is some dimension k that a strict majority of agents view as a good. Let J
be the set of agents who think k is a good and let A = {k′ : such that uk′i =
1 for some i ∈ J}. If x ∈ UC(u) and ` /∈ A, then x` < K.
• It seems that Proposition 2 generalizes to higher dimensions. A Con-
dorcet winner will have to be a vertex. What conditions ensure that this
vertex Condorcet is a Condorcet winner? Using Farkas’ Lemma, it seems that
a complete characterization of preference profiles for which this holds is pos-
sible! Once again, this will depart from Plott’s symmetry conditions.
• It seems that we can also generalize Proposition 3 to higher dimensions,
as follows. Define the vertex Top Cycle, denoted V TC(u), to be the subset of
vertices that are in the Top Cycle of the majority weak tournament restricted
to the vertices and the vertex bottom cycle, denoted V BC(u), to be the subset
of vertices that are in the bottom cycle of the majority weak tournament
restricted to the vertices. We conjecture that
TC(u) =
{
x ∈ X : xk = 0 for all ek ∈ V BC(u)
}
.
This implies that if a vertex is in the vertex top cycle, then it is in the
Top Cycle, but the converse does not hold, as we know already from the case
where K = N = 3.
• The computation of the Uncovered Set does not seem out of reach either.
One preliminary question we may ask could be the following. Define the Vertex
Uncovered Set to be the subset of vertices which are in the Uncovered Set of
the majority weak tournament restricted to the vertices. Is it true that a
vertex is in the Vertex Uncovered Set must also be in the Uncovered Set? We
know that the converse does not hold from Proposition 4.
• Finally, a detailed exploration of Example 3 would be valuable. It is
straightforward to check that if there is a Condorcet winner, it must give the
whole allocation to the public project. Furthermore, this project is a Con-
dorcet winner if and only if
b ≥ 1(
N
2
)−
+ 1
.
The following conjecture, extending Proposition 7, could be considered.
Conjecture: Consider the private versus public goods model. If b > 1M for
some positive integer M , then x ∈ UC(b) ⇒ # {i : xi > 0} < M . Further-
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more, if b < 1M−1 , then UC(b) = {x ∈ X : xi = 0 for at least N −M + 1
voters}.
Note that the first assertion is true from an analysis of the Pareto set.
Only the second assertion remains to be proved.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: Let x be a Condorcet winner for u. We first
show that x must be on the boundary of the triangle. Assume to the contrary
that x is in the interior of X. Then, for all i, j ∈ N , the indifference lines of
voters i and j passing through x must be identical, as otherwise, there would
exist y in the neighborhood of x such that ui · y > ui · x and uj · y > uj · x,
contradicting our assumption that x is a Condorcet winner. This implies that
the slopes of the indifference lines of voters i and j through x are the same,
so that vivj = 1. This cannot be, as there is no solution (v1, v2, v3) ∈ (0, 1)3
to the system of equations
v1v2 = 1, v1v3 = 1 and v2v3 = 1.
So we have shown that a Condorcet winner must be on the boundary of X.
Next, we show that a Condorcet winner must be a vertex. We know from
above that a Condorcet winner x can be written as x = λei+(1−λ)ej for some
0 < λ < 1. Then, either uk ·ei > uk ·ej , in which case ei majority dominates ej
via the coalition {i, k}; or, uk ·ei < uk ·ej , in which case ej majority dominates
ei via the coalition {j, k}. Therefore, either λ = 0 or λ = 1, and the Condorcet
winner must be a vertex.
We complete the proof by showing that (2) must apply and that vj+vk ≥ 1
for some j and k. Without loss of generality, let x = e1. Then, u must fall in
(2) and it must be that either
u =
1 v2 v3
v1 1 0
0 0 1
or u =
1 v2 v3
0 1 0
v1 0 1
.
Indeed, since e1 majority dominates e2 and e3, then either e3 is the worst
choice for 1 and 2 or e2 is the worst choice for 1 and 3. Without loss of
generality, consider the first case. For e1 to be Condorcet winner it is necessary
and sufficient that there not exist (y1, y2) ∈ X such that
v2y1 + y2 > v2 and (v3 − 1)y1 − y2 > v3 − 1.
It is straightforward to check that this system of inequalities is consistent with
(y1, y2) ∈ X if and only if v2 + v3 < 1.
Proof of Proposition 3 : Assume that there is no Condorcet winner.
We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: There is no vertex Condorcet winner.
In this case, up to a permutation, e1T (u)e2T (u)e3T (u)e1 and from (d)
above, the cycle extends to the whole boundary of X: for any two points z
and w on the boundary there is a weak T -chain between z and w. Now take x
and y in X. Since there is no Condorcet winner, we deduce from (c) above that
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there exist z and w on the boundary of X such that xT (u)z and wT (u)y. The
existence of a weak T -chain between x and y follows from the juxtaposition
of the three weak T -chains. This proves that TC(u) = X.
Case 2: There is a vertex Condorcet winner.
Without loss of generality, assume that e1 is the vertex Condorcet winner.
Since e1 is not a Condorcet winner, there exists z on the segment
[
e2, e3
]
such
that zT (u)e1. From (b) above, we deduce that e1T (u)e2T (u)zT (u)e1 and from
(d) above the cycle extends to the entire boundary of the triangle with vertices
e1, e2 and z, as illustrated in Fig. 5.
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We first show that for all x, y ∈ [e1, e2] ∪ [e2, e3] ∪ [e2, e3] ∪ [e1, z] such
that x 6= e3, there exists a weak T -chain from x to y. For any x ∈ [e1, e2] ∪[
e2, z
] ∪ [z, e1], the claim follows from the existence of a cycle as in claim.
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Consider now the case where x ∈ [e1, e3]∪ [z, e3] with x 6= e3. The idea is to
construct a weak T -chain starting from x and ending in h belonging to the
smaller triangle with vertices e1, e2 and z; once there, we just demonstrated
that you can anywhere else on the boundary of X. The construction goes as
follows.
First consider f ∈ [z, e3] and let g be the intersection of [e1, e3] with
the indifference line of voter 2 passing through f . Given the slopes of the
indifference line of voters 2 and 3, it is easy to see that this point is well
defined and that u3 · g > u3 · f . Then, define h as being the intersection of
the indifference line of voter 3 with either
[
z, e1
]
or
[
z, e3
]
. Given the slopes
of the indifference lines of voters 1 and 3, it is easy to see that this point is
well defined and that u1 ·h > u1 ·g. We have obtained the short weak T -chain
fT (u)gT (u)h. This is illustrated in Fig. 6.
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If h ∈ [z, e1], we have completed the desired argument. If instead, h ∈[
z, e3
]
, it is easy to show that | h− e3 |>| f − e3 |. Starting from h, we repeat
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the argument above to obtain g′ and h′ ∈ [z, e1] ∪ [z, e3]. If h′ ∈ [z, e1], we
are done. Otherwise, we continue this process. After a finite number of steps,
we will obtain a point in
[
z, e1
]
. This is illustrated in Fig. 7.
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Connection to [e1, Z]
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The case where f ∈ [e1, e3] follows from (a) above, since f = λe1+(1−λ)e3
for some λ ∈ ]0, 1[ and e1T (u)w for all w ∈ ]z, e3[, we deduce that fT (u)λw+
(1 − λ)e3. The connection involving points in the interior of X is done as in
case 1. This completes the proof of the claim that TC(u) = X\{e3}.
Proof of Proposition 4: First, note that yTx implies that y exceeds x on
exactly two dimensions.
From this it is clear that there are no weak Condorcet winners, as for any
alternative there exists some other alternative that gives more to two of the
dimensions (given that M ≥ 4).
Next, let us check that the Uncovered Set is the set of all points less
the vertices. Consider x = (u, v, w) that is defeated by some y = (a, b, c).
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Without loss of generality, let a > u, b > v, and c ≤ w − 2. Consider z =
(M − c − 1, 0, c + 1). Here, provided v > 0, x beats z and yet z beats y.
Thus, y cannot cover x. This implies that the only covered points could be
the vertices. Indeed, the vertices never beat any point, and are beaten by any
interior point, and so are covered.
To verify that the Top Cycle is X, we only need to check that the vertices
are in the Top Cycle, as the other alternatives are all uncovered. We need
to check that from any vertex, say x = (M, 0, 0), and any other alternative
y there is a weak T -chain. If y has a 0 in either of the last two dimensions,
then x and y are non-comparable, and so there is a weak T -chain directly.
Thus consider any alternative y = (u, v, w), where v > 0 and w > 0. Let
z = (u + 1, v + w − 1, 0). Then x is non-comparable to z and z defeats y,
so there is a weak T -chain from x to y. This completes the proof of the Top
Cycle.
The claims about the Banks Set are established as follows. Let us identify
a maximal T -chain with x = (u, v, w), where u ≥ v ≥ w, at the end.
Consider the case where u > v + w. (u, v, w), (u − 1, v + 2, w − 1), (u −
4, v + 6, w − 2), . . . (u − ci, v + i + ci, w − i), . . . where i is the index of the
step until w − i hits 0, then (u− ci, v − i+ w, i+ ci) for the remaining steps
until v + w − i hits 0. Let us define ci, and let i∗ be the smallest i for which
u−(i2+3i−2)/2 ≤ v+w−i. Then for i < i∗ set ci = (i2+3i−2)/2 For i ≥ i∗
set ci = u− (v+w)+ i. Let us prove that this chain is maximal. Suppose that
y = (a, b, d) beats everything in the chain. It cannot be that b ≤ v, as then
there is some point in the chain with middle entry b. Similarly d ≤ w is not
possible. So b > v and d > w. Thus it must be that a ≤ u−2. It cannot be that
a ≤ u− ci∗ , as then there is some step with first entry a. So, it must be that
a > u−ci∗ . Without loss of generality then, take a = u−ci+1, for some i < i∗.
Then it must be that b and d beat all the second and third entries above this.
This means that b+d ≥ v+w+ci−1+(i−1)+1+1 [either beating the highest
second entry and w+1, or the highest third entry and v+1 if we are already
in the second part of the algorithm] We also know from the value of a that
v+w+ci−1 ≥ b+d. This implies that ci ≥ ci−1+ i+2. This does not hold by
the definition of ci, which solving inductively amounts to ci ≥ (i2 +5i− 4)/2,
which cannot hold given that u < ((v + w)2 + 5(v + w) − 4)/2. So, we have
reached a contradiction.
So, to complete the proof consider the case where u ≤ v + w and let
us identify a maximal T -chain with x = (u, v, w) at the end. (u, v, w), (u −
1, v + 2, w − 1), (u − 2, v + 4, w − 2), . . . (u − i, v + 2i, w − i), . . . where i
is the index of the step until w − i hits 0, then (u − i, v + w − i, 2i) for the
remaining steps until u − i hits 0. Note first that this chain of length u + 1
is well defined; indeed, when i = u, v + w − i ≥ 0. Let us prove that this
chain is maximal. Assume on the contrary that y = (a, b, d) beats everything
in the chain. It cannot be that a ≤ u, as then there is some point in the
chain with first entry a. Similarly d ≤ w is not possible. The same reasoning
show that b is such that either b > v or b < v + w − u. The first case is not
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possible as it implies a+ b+d > u+ v+w which is not possible. Consider the
second case. Since (a, b, d) beats all alternatives in the chain, we deduce from
b < v + w − u that (a, b, d) is preferred by voters 1 and 3 to any alternative
in the chain. This implies a > u and d > 2u and therefore, since u ≥ v ≥ w,
a+ b+ d ≥ a+ d > 3u ≥ u+ v + w, which is not possible.
Finally let us show that for any M > 5, (M −1, 1, 0) and its permutations
are not in the Banks Set, and soB(u) 6= UC(u). The only alternatives that this
beats are (k, 0,M − k) for k < M − 1. The only chains that could conceivably
be maximal are then of the form (k, 0,M − k), (M − 1, 1, 0). If k < M − 3,
then the alternative (M − 3, 2, 1) beats both. If k ≥M − 3, then (0, 2,M − 2)
beats both (provided M − 2 > M − (M − 3) = 3, so when M > 5).
Proof of Proposition 5:
Case (1) is easily checked directly.
Let us check (2).
If s1 = s2 = 3 > s3, then it must be that every voter weakly prefers any
allocation x with x3 = 0 to any allocation y with y3 6= 0, and some voter has
a strict preference between any two such allocations. Moreover, all voters are
indifferent between any two allocations that have x3 = 0, and so the set of
weak Condorcet winners is the set {x | x3 = 0}. Since any allocation outside of
this set is defeated by one inside this set, this is the Top Cycle. Also, since the
set of weak Condorcet winners is a subset of the Banks Set, the claim follows
from Lemma 1 noting that {x | x3 = 0} = WC(u) ⊂ B(u) ⊂ UC(u) ⊂
TC(u) = {x | x3 = 0}.
If s1 = s2 = 2 > s3, then it can be checked that any allocation x with
x3 = 0 defeats any allocation y with y3 6= 0. [Such a y gets at most one vote
versus such an x, and such an x always gets at least one vote versus such a
y. For any configuration of preferences that fits in this case where such a y
gets one vote, it must be that such an x gets two votes.] Also, there must be
one voter who is indifferent between all allocations in {x | x3 = 0}, while the
other two agents split on it. Thus, again the set of weak Condorcet winners
is the set {x | x3 = 0}, and any allocation outside of this set is defeated by
one inside this set. So the rest of the proof is as in the case above.
If s1 = s2 = 1 > s3 = 0, then either there is one voter who thinks both
dimensions 1 and 2 are goods, and other voters are completely indifferent, or
there are two voters who each like one of the two dimensions, and the other
voter is indifferent between all allocations. In either situation it is clear that
the set of weak Condorcet winners is the set {x | x3 = 0}, and any allocation
outside of this set is defeated by one inside this set, as in the earlier cases.
Next, let us consider (3a). In this case, without loss of generality, suppose
that voter 1 views dimension 1 as a good, voter 2 views dimensions 2 and 3
as goods, and voter 3 is completely indifferent. If we consider two alternatives
that have the same allocation to dimension 1, then all voters are indifferent
between these alternatives. If we consider two alternatives that have different
allocations between dimension 1, then voters 1 and 2 will have opposing pref-
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erences over the alternatives. Thus, any two alternatives are non-comparable
under T (u).
Next, let us consider (3b). Note that no two voters agree on which dimen-
sions are goods. There is one voter who likes dimensions 1 and 2, one who
likes 2 and 3, and one who likes 1 and 3. One key observation is that if yT (u)x
in this case, it must be that y exceeds x on exactly one dimension and is less
than x on the two remaining dimensions. (If it is the same on any dimen-
sion then they are non-comparable. If y exceeds x on two dimensions, then
the sum of the remaining dimension together with either other dimension is
greater under x, and x will win.) This results in the following observations
about T (u).
(a) Any two alternatives which agree on some dimension are non- comparable
to each other.
(b)Any vertex will beat any alternative that is positive on the other two
dimensions.
From (a) and (b) it follows that the vertices are not beaten by any alter-
native, and from (b), it follows that any other alternative is beaten by some
vertex. Thus the set of weak Condorcet winners is exactly the set of vertices.
Next, let us show that UC(u) = X \{(M −2, 1, 1), (1,M −2, 1), (1, 1,M −
2)} ≡ X∗.
First, we show that x = (M − 2, 1, 1) is not in the Uncovered Set. Let
y = (M, 0, 0). Then, yTx. Suppose not yTz. Then, from (b), either z2 = 0 or
z3 = 0. Without loss of generality, suppose z2 = 0. In order for x to beat z,
x has to be bigger than z in just one component, and smaller than z in the
other two components. Since z2 = 0, this means that x1 < z1 and x3 < z3.
But this is not possible. So, xTz implies yTz. Hence, x is covered. Analogous
arguments establish that (1,M − 2, 1) and (1, 1,M − 2) are covered.
Next, we show that no other element in X∗ is covered.
Each vertex forms a maximal chain as a singleton and so is in the Banks
Set and thus the Uncovered Set.
Next, consider an alternative x ∈ X∗ that has two dimensions positive and
the other 0. Without loss of generality, say x = (a,M−a, 0) where a ≥M−a.
This alternative beats (0,M − 1, 1). Note also that any alternative y that has
y3 ≥ 1 does not beat (0,M−1, 1) (the voter who likes the last two dimensions
is at best indifferent, and the voter who likes the first two dimensions prefers
(0,M − 1, 1)). Thus only alternatives with y3 = 0 beat (0,M − 1, 1). Then,
it follows from (a) that forming a chain of x and (0,M − 1, 1) is a maximal
chain that results in x, and so x is in the Banks Set, and thus the Uncovered
Set. Next, consider an interior alternative x = (x1, x2, x3) ∈ X∗. Without loss
of generality, assume that x1 ≥ x2 ≥ x3. Note that since x ∈ X∗, x2 ≥ 2.
Suppose yTx and y is an interior alternative in X. Without loss of gener-
ality, let yi < xi, yj < xj and yk > xk. Of course, such i, j, k must exist. So,
yi ≤ xi−1, yj ≤ xj−1, yk ≥ xk+2. This must mean that xi ≥ 2, xj ≥ 2 since
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y is interior by assumption. Now, consider z such that zi = 0, zj = xi+xj−1,
and zk = xk + 1. Then, xTz, but zTy. So, x cannot be covered by y.
Next, suppose that yTx and y is not an interior point. If y1 = 0, then
choose z = (0, x2 + 1, x3 + x1 − 1). Since x1 ≥ 2, we have xTz. But, by (a), y
and z are non-comparable. So, y does not cover x.
If y2 = 0, then choose z = (x1 +1, 0, x3 +x2− 1). Note that since x ∈ X∗,
x2 ≥ 2. Again, xTz, but y and z are non-comparable.
The last possibility is that y3 = 0. Since yTx, there is i such that yi ≥
xi + 2. Choose z such that zi = xi + 1 < yi, zk = 0 where k 6= 0, and
z3 = M − xi − 1. Since x2 ≥ 2, check that z3 > x3. It follows that xTz and
yTz. So, x is not covered.
Thus, we have shown that UC(u) = X∗, and so Lemma 1 implies that
X∗ ⊂ TC(u). Now, consider x = (M − 2, 1, 1). We show that there is a weak
T -chain connecting x to each of the vertices. Take (M, 0, 0). Then, the weak
T -chain is (x, (M − 2, 0, 2), (M, 0, 0)). Weak T -chains to other vertices are
obvious extensions of this weak T -chain. Similarly, there is a weak T -chain
from x to any other point in X. Hence, TC(u) = X.
Next, let us identify the Banks Set. Our arguments above already show
that the Banks Set includes all alternatives that are not in the interior.
Consider x = (x1, x2, x3) in the interior. Without loss of generality, let
x1 ≥ x2 ≥ x3 ≥ 1, and since B(u) ⊂ UC(u) = X∗, we know that x2 ≥ 2.
Let k+ be the smallest integer greater than or equal to k, and k− the
greatest integer smaller than or equal to k.
Let us build a T -chain that ends in x and argue that it is maximal. This
shows that x is in the Banks Set.
The first element in the chain is x. The next part of the sequence
are the alternatives (x1 + 1, x2 − 2, x3 + 1), (x1 + 2, x2 − 4, x3 + 2), . . .,(
x1 + (x
2
2 )
−, 0, x3 + (x
2
2 )
+
)
.
Denote x1M = x
1 + (x
2
2 )
−, and x3M = x
3 + (x
2
2 )
+.
The last part of the sequence is (x1M−2, x2+1, x3M+1), . . .,
(
0, x2 + (x
1
M
2 )
− ,
x3M +
(
x1M
2
)+)
.
It is easy to check that this is a chain. Let us show that it is maximal.
Suppose y beats everything in the chain. Consider the case where y1 > x1.
The chain contains without any gap everything from x1 to x1M . So, y
1 > x1M .
But, then y cannot beat (x1M , 0, x
3
M ). The same argument rules out cases
where y2 > x2. So we are left with the case y3 > x3. In the third dimension,
the chain contains all consecutive elements from x1 to x3M +
(
x1M
2
)+
except
possibly20 x3M − 1 and x3M +
(
x1M
2
)+
− 1.
20 There are no gaps if x2 and x1M are even.
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Suppose y3 = x3M − 1. Since y3 > x3M − 2, we need y2 < 3. But, then
y1 ≥ x1M − 1. So, y does not beat (x1M − 1, 3, x3M − 2), which is the element
just before (x1M , 0, x
3
M ).
An analogous argument works if y3 = x3M +
(
x1M
2
)+
− 1.
(3c) follows from Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 6: Let x = (x1, x2) ∈ X. We examine the indifferences
lines of voters 1 and 2 through x. The four possible cases are:
• The indifference line of voter 1 through x intersects [e2, e3] and the in-
difference line of voter 2 through x intersects
[
e1, e3
]
(This is the case
considered in Proposition 6)
• The indifference line of voter 1 through x intersects [e2, e3] and the indif-
ference line of voter 2 through x intersects
[
e1, e2
]
• The indifference line of voter 1 through x intersects [e1, e2] and the indif-
ference line of voter 2 through x intersects
[
e1, e3
]
• The indifference line of voter 1 through x intersects [e1, e2] and the indif-
ference line of voter 2 through x intersects
[
e1, e2
]
This leads to a partition of the triangle X into four areas as indicated in
Fig. 8.
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-
Figure 8
The Four Areas
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We can check that whenever x belongs to areas 2, 3 and 4, L2(x) = X.
From lemma 2, this implies that the union of these areas is included in the
uncovered set. Assume now that x belongs to the first area. Then, L(x) is the
union of the quadrilateral xAe3B and the two triangles xCD and xEF . This
pattern is depicted in Fig. 9 where the hatched area corresponds to L(x).21
21 Up to the exclusion of the boundaries.
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6
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Figure 9
L(X) and L2(X)
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From Lemma 2, to test if x ∈ UC(u), it is enough to calculate L2(x).
From the geometry of the problem, it is straightforward to verify that L2(x)
is the union of the two triangles e3FG and e3DH where G is the intersection of[
e2, e3
]
with the indifference line of voter 1 through F andH is the intersection
of
[
e1, e3
]
with the indifference line of voter 2 through D. Let I ≡ (w1, w2) be
the intersection of the linesGF andDH. Therefore, L2(x) = X iff w1+w2 < 1.
The rest of the proof amounts to simple calculus.
The first coordinate of F , say f1, is solution of the equation
v2f1 = v2x1 + x2
or
f1 = x1 +
x2
v2
.
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Therefore, the line FG is described by the equation
y1 + v1y2 = x1 +
x2
v2
Similarly, the second coordinate of D, say d2, is solution of the linear equation
v1d2 = x1 + v1x2
or
d2 =
x1
v1
+ x2.
Therefore, the line DH is described by the equation
v2y1 + y2 =
x1
v1
+ x2.
We deduce that
w1 =
x2
v2
and w2 =
x1
v1
,
which implies the conclusion.
Proof of Proposition 7:
(1) Let b > 12 and x ∈ X with x4 < 1. Then, for at least two of the voters,
say i and j, xi ≤ 1−x42 and xj ≤ 1−x42 . Therefore, since b > 12 ,
uk · x = xk + bx4 ≤ 1− x42 + bx4 < b = uk · (0, 0, 0, 1) for k ∈ {i, j} .
We deduce that (0, 0, 0, 1)T (b)x and the conclusion follows.
(2) Let 13 < b <
1
2 . It is clear that WC(b) = ∅ as (12 , 12 , 0, 0)T (b)(0, 0, 0, 1).
Let us prove that UC(b) = {x ∈ X : xi = 0 for at least one i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, xk 6=
M for any k{1, 2, 3}}.
(i) UC(b) ⊂ {x ∈ X : xi = 0 for at least one i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, xk 6= M for any
k{1, 2, 3}}.
Let x ∈ X with xi > 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Let y = (x1 − δ, x2 − δ, x3 −
δ, x4 + 3δ) where 0 < δ < Min (x1, x2, x3). Since b > 13 , y Pareto dominates
and therefore covers x. Next, suppose that xk = M for some k ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Then, x is covered by (0, 0, 0,M), as x does not defeat any alternative.
(ii) UC(b) ⊃ {x ∈ X : xi = 0 for at least one i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and xk 6= M
for any k ∈ {1, 2, 3}}. Without loss of generality, consider the case where
x3 = 0. Suppose that, contrary to the assertion, x is covered by y. Since we
can take y to be uncovered, from (i) we deduce that either y = (y1, y2, 0, y4) or
y = (y1, 0, y3, y4) or y = (0, y2, y3, y4). Let us consider the case where x4 6= 0.
Case 1 : y = (y1, y2, 0, y4).
Subcase 1 : y4 ≤ x4. Since yTx, we deduce that y4 6= x4 and therefore
y1 > x1 and y2 > x2. It follows that (x1, x2, 0, x4)T (y1 + y2, 0, 0, y4) but not
[(y1, y2, 0, y4)T (y1 + y2, 0, 0, y4)]. This shows that y does not cover x.
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Subcase 2 : y4 > x4. The extra public good y4 − x4 is financed by voters
1 and 2. Without loss of generality, assume that voter 2 pays at least half of
the cost i.e. y2−x2 ≤ −y4−x42 . Consider the vector z ≡ (1− y2− by4− ε, y2 +
by4+ ², 0, 0) where ε is a small positive number. Note that for ε small enough,
z is a feasible allocation as y2 + by4 < y2 + y42 < 1 since b <
1
2 . Then, for ε
small enough, xTz since x4 6= 0 while however Not [yTz]. This shows again
that y does not cover x.
Case 2 : y = (y1, 0, y3, y4).
Subcase 1 : y4 ≤ x4. Then, for sufficiently small but positive, ², we have:
(x1, x2, 0, x4)T (y1+y3, ², 0, y4−²) but Not [(y1, 0, y3, y4)T (y1 + y3, ², 0, y4 − ²)]
This shows that y does not cover x.
Subcase 2 : y4 > x4. Clearly, 3 prefers y to x. Suppose first that 1 also
prefers y to x (and therefore that 2 prefers x to y), and consider the vector
z ≡ (1 − by4 − ε, by4 + ε, 0, 0), where ε is a small positive number. Then,
for small enough ε, z is a feasible allocation and xTz while, not [yTz]. If
instead 1 prefers x to y, and therefore 2 prefers y to x, consider the vector
z ≡ (y2 + by4 + ε, 0, 1 − y2 − by4 − ε, 0), where ε is a small positive number.
Then, for small enough ε, z is a feasible allocation and xTz since x4 6= 0,
while not [yTz]. This again shows that y does not cover x.
Case 3 : y = (0, y2, y3, y4). This case is similar to case 2.
Consider the situation where x4 = 0. The analysis has to be changed
slightly.
Case 1 : y = (y1, y2, 0, y4). Since yTx and b < 12 , it must be that y4 > 0.
Furthermore, either y1+ by4 < x1 or y2+ by4 < x2. Without loss of generality
assume that the second inequality holds and let z ≡ (0, y2 + by4 + ε, 1− y2 −
by4, 0), where ε is a small positive number. Then, for small enough ε, z is a
feasible allocation and xTz while not [yTz].
Case 2 : y = (y1, 0, y3, y4).
Subcase 1 : y4 = 0. Since x1 6= 0 and x2 6= 0, we deduce from Proposition 4
that y cannot cover x.
Subcase 2 : y4 > 0. Clearly, 3 prefers y to x. Suppose that 1 also prefers
y to x (and therefore that 2 prefers x to y), and consider the vector z ≡
(0, by4 + ε, 1− by4− ε, 0), where ε is a small positive number. Then, for small
enough ε, z is a feasible allocation and xTz while not [yTz]. If on the other
hand, 1 prefers x to y, and therefore 2 prefers y to x, consider the vector
z ≡ (y1 + by4 + ε, 0, 1 − y1 − by4 − ε, 0) where ε is a small positive number.
Then, for small enough ε, z is a feasible allocation and xTz since x2 6= 0 while
not [yTz]. This shows again that y does not cover x.
Case 3 : y = (0, y2, y3, y4). Similar to case 2.
(3) Let b < 13 . Then
UC(b) =
{
x ∈ X : x4 = 0 and xk 6= M for any k ∈ {1, 2, 3}}
The inclusion UC(b) ⊂ {x ∈ X : x4 = 0 } follows from the fact that if b < 13 ,
then any x such that x4 > 0 is Pareto dominated and therefore covered. Since
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any alternative in UC(b | PO(b))22 where PO(b) denotes the set of Pareto
undominated allocations is in UC(b)23, we deduce from Proposition 4 that
UC(b) contains the set {
x ∈ X : x4 = 0 } .
We now only need to prove that the vertices are not in UC(b). This follows
from the fact that for any vertex x, there is no y such that xTy.
To complete the proof, it remains to be shown that if b < 12 , then TC(b) =
X.
From (3c) in Proposition 2 we know that any alternative in the set
X˜ ≡ {x = (x1, x2, x3, x4) ∈ X : x4 = 0 } is connected to any other alter-
native in that set (the weak T -chain is in X˜). To conclude it remains to prove
that X˜ and X\X˜ are connected. Let x ∈ X with x4 > 0. Since b < 12 ,
(x1 + x42 , x2 +
x4
2 , x3, 0)Tx. Finally, observe that xT (x1 + x4, x2, x3, 0).
22 For any A ⊆ X, UC(b | A) denotes the Uncovered Set when the set of alternatives
is restricted to the subset A.
23 We leave the proof of this simple claim to the reader. Note however that the
reverse inclusion UC ⊆ UC(PO) does not always hold i.e., while the deletion
of Pareto undominated alternatives can never hurts an alternative already in
the Uncovered Set, the consideration of such alternatives may help some other
alternatives which would not be in otherwise!
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